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Relating Unlawful Use of Force 
and the War Crime of 
Disproportionate Force Not 
Justified By Military Necessity 
Mbori Otieno,* Emmah Wabuke,** and Smith Otieno*** 
Jus ad bellum and jus in bello are not disparate in 
operation. There are several points of intersection in the two 
concepts, commencing with the context in which they apply, and 
further, in their interpretation of the general principles of 
proportionality and necessity. Although proportionality connotes 
divergent theoretical notions depending on the backdrop against 
which it is set, in practice, these notions are often fused 
together. However, points of fission (divergence) still persist. 
The best example of which is in the context of ‘The Crime of 
Disproportionate Use of Force’ where the difference between the 
two notions of ‘proportionality’ can be described as the 
limitations on the overall force used to respond to an armed 
attack under jus ad bellum as opposed to the balance between 
the anticipated military advantage weighed against the resulting 
loss of civilian life under jus in bello. The authors argue that 
there is need for fusion (convergence) between jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello particularly in relation to modern war crimes 
trials in order to ensure that both principles have practical 
significance. This would ensure further convergence between jus 
in bello and jus ad bellum. To fulfill the shielding purpose of law 
in the context of armed conflict, more fusion between these two 
concepts must be embraced in all fora, including, 
conceptualization of crime of aggression and distinguishing 
between combatants and civilians. 
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I. Introduction 
The cardinal principle governing jus in bello demands a 
distinction between combatants and civilians and authorizes the 
attack of the former. In essence, loss of civilian life is prohibited 
unless it occurs within the context of the principles of necessity and 
proportionality. In contrast, the cardinal principle governing jus ad 
bellum is that States are not allowed to use force unless done in 
individual or collective self-defense. Based on the foregoing, then, two 
questions arise. First, can the use of force in wars of aggression be 
prosecuted as the war crime of disproportionate force not justified by 
military necessity? Second, do the principles of proportionality and 
necessity play an extended role where jus ad bellum has been 
observed, hence creating a wider justification to an eventuality of loss 
of civilian life or negating lawful use of force to unlawful use not 
justified by any military necessity? 
Prior to the development of modern international law and the 
advent of the League of Nations and the United Nations, the legal 
rules that governed the use of force by nations were derived solely 
from the norms of customary international law. These were norms 
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that would arise from the convergence of general and consistent State 
practice and opinio juris.1 Early attempts at developing a concrete 
and binding legal statement on the prohibition of the use of armed 
force through multilateral treaties such as the Covenant of the League 
of Nations,2 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact3 proved ineffective and were 
ultimately replaced by the United Nations Charter. 
In this regard, the authors posit that there is need for fusion 
(convergence) between jus ad bellum and jus in bello particularly in 
relation to modern war crimes trials in order to ensure that both 
principles have practical significance. The principles of proportionality 
and necessity as used in jus ad bellum and as used in jus in bello can 
be fused for practical significance and to bolster the position of jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello in enforcement of international criminal law. 
The authors argue that in the assessment of proportionality and 
necessity under jus in bello, international tribunals can, and have in 
the past, considered proportionality and necessity in jus ad bellum. 
This makes the case for the fusion of the concepts in the unlawful use 
of force vis-à-vis the war crime disproportionate use of force, not 
justified by military necessity.  
For easier comprehension, the authors have divided the essay into 
three broad parts: Part I assesses jus ad bellum in a generic sense and 
its relationship to the cases of disproportionate use of force as viewed 
from a jus ad bellum point of view. Part II then addresses the points 
of fission (divergence) and fusion (convergence) between jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello. Here the authors do not attempt any arguments on 
whether there should be any kind of fission or fusion between the two 
 
1. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (6th ed. 2008); JOHN H. 
CURRIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND THEORY 
120-44 (2007). 
2. Covenant of the League of Nations art. 12, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. 
T.S. 188, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art12 
[http://perma.cc/S7PK-VS2R] (“The Members of the League agree 
that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a 
rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial 
settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to 
resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or 
the judicial decision, or the report by the Council. In any case under 
this Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be 
made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be 
made within six months after the submission of the dispute.”). 
3. Kellogg-Briand Pact art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 
57, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm 
[http://perma.cc/78S2-TGJ6] (“The High Contracting Parties solemnly 
declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn 
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and 
renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with 
one another.”). 
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broad parts. Part III then endeavors to argue for the construction of 
more fission between the two areas of law using the war crime of 
disproportionate use of force not justified by military necessity as a 
backdrop. The last part in this section seeks to draw a case for more 
fusion by using the dichotomy of combatants and civilians in jus in 
bello and jus ad bellum as a focus area. In this part the authors argue 
for a convergence of the two broad concepts of international law for 
morally justifiable outcomes. This is done with the background 
understanding that the two concepts are currently viewed as 
divergent when it comes to enforcement under international criminal 
law. 
A. Unlawful Use of Force: Assessing Jus Ad Bellum 
1. Introduction 
While the most common starting point in the assessment of the 
modern unlawful use of force is the United Nations Charter, the idea 
of a “just war” is in essence a transformation of older ideas. 
Two Catholic saints, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas are credited 
with formulation of a “just war” doctrine.4 This doctrine is 
characterized by three main principles: the authoritativeness of the 
initiator of war, just reasons for waging war, and the legitimate 
intentions of war.5 Due to obvious ties of the foregoing writers to the 
Church, this viewpoint was characteristically founded on natural law.6 
Although this doctrine has been expanded numerously in 
subsequent years, the cardinal principles have been maintained, as 
evidenced by the relevant provisions in the United Nations Charter.7 
Article 2(4) of the Charter contains the general proscription 
against the use of force: “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial sovereignty or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.8“ 
This provision is couched in mandatory terms, exposing the 
seriousness in which the concept of jus ad bellum is regarded.  
However, Article 51 of the UN Charter then contains a limited 
exception to the general prohibition on the use of force: 
 
4. Sheng Hongsheng, The Evolution of Law of War, 1 CHINESE J. INT’L 
POL. 267, 267-301 (2006). 
5. GU DEXIN, ZHAN ZHENG XIN LUN [NEW THEORY OF WAR] 48 (1990); 
Peter Haggenmacher, Just War and Regular War in Sixteenth Century 
Spanish Doctrine, 32 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 434, 436 (1992). 
6. See LI JIASHAN, GUO JI FA XUE SHI XIN LUN [NEW COMMENT ON 
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORY] 43 (1987). 
7. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1. 
8. Id. at art. 2, ¶ 4.                                
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise 
of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority 
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in 
order to maintain or restore international peace and security…9 
This article, therefore, provides for the permissible cases when a 
State may use armed force, that is, in situations of individual or 
collective self-defense. However, there is a caveat attached: there must 
be a United Nations Security Council Resolution supporting this 
action. Thus, the assumption here is that when a State takes up arms 
against another State or entity, said State or entity will be acting in 
violation of the rule prohibiting the resort to force in international law 
embedded in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This serious violation 
found in Article 2(4) is termed aggression.10 The entity who violates 
this provision against a State would therefore be an aggressor under 
international law. For purposes of this article, the party that is 
subject to the aggression will be referred to as the “self-defending 
State or entity.” 
Therefore, what is referred to as unlawful use of force is really the 
violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. If States or non-State 
entities resort to use of force other than as authorized under the UN 
Charter, that use of force is unlawful under international law. This 
means that while the general rule seems to be founded on the 
prohibition of the use of force, the use of force in international 
relations is not unlawful, except as authorized by the United Nations 
Charter. Despite this sense of general prohibition on the resort to the 
use of force in the UN Charter, conflict and hostilities that involve the 
use of armed force remain constant features of the international 
politics.11 
 
9. Id. at art. 51.  
10. U.N. Charter, supra note 7, at art. 2, ¶ 4. While it seems easy enough, 
the definition of aggression has been the source of a huge struggle over 
the years in international relations and politics. Recently in 2010 an 
amendment has been proposed to the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice including aggression as an international crime to be recognized 
by the International Criminal Court (addressed in Part III). See 
Assembly of States Parties, Res. RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010).  
11. Elihu Lauterpacht, The Legal Irrelevance of the “State of War”, 62 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 58, 59 (1968).  
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From this general principle on jus ad bellum four legal 
consequences come to bear. The first being that what was previously 
a legal status of a “declaration of war”12 no longer exists. States can 
no longer avail themselves to what was previously known as 
“belligerent rights.” These rights include “the seizure of enemy ship or 
other property at sea or on land under the law of naval warfare, the 
law of land warfare, and the trading with the enemy legislation, as 
well as rights of visit, search, and seizure exercised with respect to 
neutral merchant shipping.”13  
The second is that the law of neutrality has been placed within 
new confines, although not eliminated entirely. One State may assist 
another State, but only when that State is acting within the confines 
of the law, for example when acting in individual or collective self-
defense.14 Previously, there was an obligation for third parties to 
remain neutral, refrain from assisting belligerents, and to treat 
combatants neutrally.  
The third is that a State that employs force unlawfully cannot 
validly secure sovereignty over territory captured during war. Fourth, 
and lastly, the use of force by the State acting lawfully must be 
proportionate to the degree of force employed against it.15 This fourth 
consequence of the unlawful use of force is linked to the jus in bello 
crime of disproportionate use of force not justified by military 
necessity. This is the limb on which this essay attempts to focus. 
While the norm prohibiting the use of force in Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter was previously envisioned to be binding as against 
member States of the UN only, the norm has crystallized into what is 
known as a peremptory norm of international law or jus cogens 
norm.16 This is defined as “a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which 
 
12. See id. (explaining that the term “war” refers to a narrow legal and 
technical situation which begins with a declaration of war and ends with 
a peace treaty). 
13. Richard R. Baxter et al., The Legal Consequences of the Unlawful Use 
of Force Under the Charter, 62 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 68, 68-9 
(1968). 
14. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 
402-04 (1963). 
15. See Richard A. Falk, International Law and the United States Role in 
the Viet Nam War, 75 YALE L.J. 1122, 1144 (1966) (“Elementary 
principles of . . . international law require that force legitimately used 
must be . . . somewhat proportional to the provocation.”). 
16. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 100 ¶ 190 (June 27) (indicating 
that the I.C.J. has regarded the prohibition of the use of force as being a 
conspicuous example of a rule of international law having the character 
of jus cogens). 
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no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.”17 Since jus cogens is part of international customary law, 
it is legally binding for all members of the international community, 
regardless of whether they have expressed their approval or 
disapproval of a particular norm or not.18 The violation of jus cogens 
norms creates a right for any State in the international community to 
seek redress because the obligation that these norms create is held as 
against the entire international community (erga omnes).19 
2. Unlawful use of force in jus ad bellum: The Case of Disproportionate 
Use of Force 
As stated in the previous section, one of the consequences of the 
general principle on the prohibition of the use of force is that a lawful 
act of self-defense might be negated and made unlawful if it is 
disproportionate to the aggressor’s initial attack. Thus, in jus ad 
bellum the use of force in self-defense must be strictly confined to a 
set defensive objective.20 Under jus ad bellum, proportionality is 
applicable to any use of force, be it legally controversial, such as in 
humanitarian interventions,21 or in instances of legitimate use of force 
authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC).22 The principle of  
17. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (It is important to stress here however, that the definition 
is given in the context of the law of treaties and explains the term by 
effect of these norms as being non-derogable by a treaty. But at the 
same time, this definition has also been adopted to general international 
law and has been used outside the field of the law of treaties.). 
18. See Rudolf Bernhardt, Customary International Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 898, 904 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992) 
(“[I]t remains doubtful . . . how long an objector can remain outside the 
binding force of customary norms.”).  
19. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. 
Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83, at art. 48 (Jan. 28, 2002) 
(explaining that rights created by jus cogens norms); See Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 
33 (Feb. 5) (clarifying obligations under erga omnes). 
20. Dapo Akande, Nuclear Weapons, Unclear Law? Deciphering the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court, 68 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L 165, 191 (1997). 
21. See Christine M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A “Good” or “Bad” War? 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 841, 844 (1999); see also Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory 
Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 834, 839 
(1999). 
22. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 631 (Bruno 
Simma et al eds., 3rd ed. 1994) (illustrating that in this case, 
proportionality would be measured between the UNSC military action 
and the general objective that this action is authorized to pursue 
according to the relevant UNSC resolution). 
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proportionality is well established in self-defense by States both in 
State practice23 and case law.24 
3. Unlawful use of force in jus in bello: The Case of Disproportionate Use 
of Force 
There are certain principles that underlie the law of armed 
conflict and must be observed during the occurrence of any type of 
armed conflict. These principles are especially important as gap fillers 
when no specific rule governs a certain situation. The traditional 
approach was anchored on three principles: 1) military necessity, 2) 
humanity, and 3) chivalry.25 
The principle of military necessity enables a belligerent to apply 
compulsion and force of any kind to the extent necessary to realize 
the purpose of the war. This concept presupposes controlled force and 
that the force is necessary to achieve, as quickly as possible, the 
partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least possible 
expenditure of lives, resources, and money.26 The principle of 
humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction not 
actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military 
purposes. This principle confirms the now celebrated principle of 
distinction, which provides for the basic immunity of civilian persons 
and property from being attacked during an armed conflict. The 
principle of chivalry refers to the conduct in armed conflicts where 
certain recognized formalities and courtesies were observed. These 
formalities included, for example, the prohibitions against 
 
23. The following States have made similar statements, see Russia (UN Doc 
S/PV.5489, 14 July 2006, 7); Qatar (UN Doc S/PV.5493, 21 July 2006, 
14); China (UN Doc S/PV.5489, 14 July 2006, 11); Japan (UN Doc 
S/PV.5489, 14 July 2006, 12); France (UN Doc S/PV.5493 (Resumption 
1), 21 July 2006, 11); Slovakia (UN Doc S/PV.5493, 21 July 2006, 19); 
Finland (UN Doc S/PV.5493 (Resumption I), 21 July 2006, 16); Greece 
(UN Doc S/PV.5489, 14 July 2006, 17 and (UN Doc S/PV.5493 
Resumption 1), 21 July 2006, 3); See also (UN Doc S/PV. 1320, 16 Nov. 
1966, 19) (providing state reactions to military actions conducted by 
Israel in the past and, in particular, statements in relation to the 1966 
Israeli intervention in Jordan of the United Kingdom). 
24. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 237 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua v 
U.S.]; Oil Platforms (Iran v US), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. ¶ 76-77 (Nov. 
6); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. ¶ 147 (Dec. 
19). 
25. William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in 
Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 93 (1982). 
26. See Robert W. Gehring, Loss of Civilian Protections under the Fourth 
Geneva Convention and Protocol I, 90 MIL. L. REV. 49, 54-58 (1980) 
(explaining the implications of the principle of military necessity). 
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dishonorable or treacherous conduct and against the misuse of enemy 
uniforms or flags of truce.27 The days of gentlemanly warfare are long 
gone, however, and only small vestiges of this principle remain.  
The balance between the principle of military necessity and that 
of humanity then bears upon the principle of proportionality. A 
military commander is not allowed to cause collateral injury to 
noncombatants or damage to civilian objects that is disproportionate 
to the military advantage derived from an operation.28 
In jus in bello the analysis is based on the incidental loss of 
civilian life. Proportionality is referred to here in both legal 
literature,29 as well as international case law,30 in relation to civilians 
and civilian objects, as requiring that attacks do not cause excessive 
damage to the latter in comparison with the direct and concrete 
military advantage anticipated from attacks. Launching an attack 
that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination of both, and 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated, is prohibited under jus in bello.31 
4. Conclusion 
From the latter analysis we see that the principle of 
proportionality plays an important role in the laws of armed conflict. 
In jus ad bellum it gauges the lawfulness of the strategic goals in the 
use of force for self-defense, and in jus in bello it gauges the lawfulness 
of any armed attack that causes civilian casualties. 
B. Points of Fusion: Proportionality Under jus in bello and jus ad bellum 
1. Introduction 
The most obvious point of fusion between the two notions is the 
similarity in their field of application. Both notions govern the area of 
 
27. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 227 (7th ed. 
1952). 
28. Fenrick, supra note 25. 
29. Henri Meyrowitz, The Principle of Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary 
Suffering 34 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 98, 109-10 (1994); Hamutal Esther 
Shamash, How Much Is Too Much? An Examination of the Principle of 
Jus in Bello Proportionality, 2 ISR. DEF. FORCES L. R. 103, 104 (2006); 
Bernard L. Brown, The Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian 
Law of Warfare: Recent Efforts at Codification 10 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 
134, 134 (1977). 
30. Prosecutor v Gotovina and Others, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 
1171, 1172, 1183, 1191 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the former Yugoslavia 
Apr. 15, 2011); Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A. Judgment, ¶ 
190 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006). 
31. Akande, supra 20, at 209. 
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armed conflict, with both trying to act as restraints upon activity 
that would be considered legally unjustified. It is well settled for jus 
in bello, for instance, that the means and methods of warfare are not 
unlimited.32 Proportionality under jus ad bellum also has a restraining 
role in the conduct of hostilities as the self-defending State has to 
consider the following factors: damage caused to the aggressor State 
by the defending action, the means used by the State acting in self-
defense, and the duration of the whole military operation.33 
The other point of fusion is the balancing nature that each notion 
requires and the factors that are to be considered when such analysis 
is being undertaken. Indeed, the two notions of proportionality do not 
actually require striking a balance between two similar quantities, as 
any proportionate balance normally does. Rather, they require putting 
an action in relation to its aim; this action, which includes the 
damage that it causes, is required not to exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the intended aim. Basically, this is a teleological balance 
exercise, which results from the application of a necessity test. In this 
sense, the two notions of proportionality have a close relationship 
with necessity.34   
2. The Fission: The Crime of Disproportionate Use of Force Not Justified 
By Military Necessity 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
defines war crimes as, inter alia, “serious violations of the laws and 
customs applicable in international armed conflict” and “serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in an armed conflict not 
of an international character.”35 In relation to proportionality, the 
ICC Statute defines a war crime as the act of:  
intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such 
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects…. Which would be clearly excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated.36 
 
32. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 
art. 35, July 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Protocol I]. 
33. Nicaragua v U.S., supra note 24, at ¶ 237. 
34. Raphael van Steenberghe, Proportionality under Jus ad bellum and Jus 
in bello: Clarifying their Relationship, 45 ISR. L. REV. 107, 113 (2012). 
35. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC]. 
36. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
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This principle is anchored on the “fundamental principle that 
belligerents do not enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict 
damage on the enemy.”37 Proportionality under jus in bello is 
measured by reference to the “immediate aims” of each single military 
attack, rather than the “ultimate goals” of the broader military 
action.38 
The difference between the two ‘proportionality principles’ can be 
described as the limitations on the overall force used to respond to the 
grievance under jus ad bellum as opposed to the balance between the 
anticipated military advantage of attacking a particular objective, 
weighed against the resulting loss of civilian life under jus in bello.39 
Steenberghe refers to this distinction as the “general vs. particular 
dichotomy.”40 The two notions also have a fission of foundational 
logic. While the proportionality requirement in jus ad bellum is based 
on a superior right of the attacked State in regard to the attacker, the 
legal regulation of the means and methods of warfare is dominated by 
the principle of the parity of the belligerents and by the concomitant 
principle of the respect owed by each of them to the interests and 
values of a humanitarian nature.41 
While in theory both notions seem to be distinct, in practice the 
two proportionality principles are often merged.42 In applying the 
proportionality principle in jus ad bellum, one would have to analyze 
the choice of weaponry, which then has implications for jus in bello.43 
On the contrary, Gardam argues that the proportionality requirement 
in jus ad bellum has no humanitarian content: “it was traditionally 
related exclusively to limitations on the damage of the territory of a 
state and of third states.”44 This paper specifically refutes this  
37. Judith Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law 87, AM. 
J. INT’L L. 391, 391 (1993). 
38. Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello? Reaffirming 
the Separation of the Two Bodies of Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 963, 
976 (2008). 
39. Gardam, supra note 38. 
40. See van Steesnberghe, supra note 35, at 115. 
41. Enzo Canizzaro, Contextualising Proportionality: Jus ad Bellum and Jus 
in Bello in the Lebanese War, 88: 864 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 779, 782 
(2006). 
42. Id. at 781. 
43. Christopher Greenwood, Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello in the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 258 
(Laurence Boisson de Chazournes et al eds., 1999).  
44. Judith Gardam, Necessity and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum and Jus 
in Bello, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 258 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes 
et al eds., 1999).  
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argument as it has negative implications for deterring the arbitrary 
loss of civilian life, which is considered an important goal in the 
theatre of war. 
C. Constructing a Fusion: The Crime of Disproportionate Use of Force 
not justified by Military Necessity 
1. Conceptualizing the Crime of Aggression 
While under jus in bello certain grave violations of the Geneva 
Conventions, the Additional Protocols, and further the violation of 
the proportionality requirement in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) can be 
prosecuted as war crimes. The unlawful use of force that violates the 
proportionality requirement in jus ad bellum cannot be prosecuted as 
such. This problem is compounded by the fact that defining 
aggression, which is the precursor of a self-defending action from 
another State, has been highly controversial since day one of the 
negotiations that culminated in the adoption of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) by the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries in 1998.45 Two contentious issues arose 
in the discussions on the crime of aggression: 1) how was State action 
going to be translated to individual liability; and 2) what was the role 
to be afforded to the United Nations Security Council as a filter for 
prosecutions of the crime of aggression.46 
The crime of aggression was included in the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the ICC,47 but the competence of the ICC to prosecute 
aggression was made subject to the adoption of a definition of the 
crime and the circumstances under which the ICC could exercise 
jurisdiction.48 Following years of intensive deliberations and 
negotiations, the matter was finally settled by the Review Conference 
of the International Criminal Court that was held in Kampala, 
Uganda on May 31 through June 11, 2010. The definition of the crime 
of aggression by an individual is based on an act of aggression 
committed by a State.  
The definition adopted in Kampala simply repeats the provisions 
of the General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of December 14, 
1974, dealing with acts of aggression.49 It defines aggression as the use 
 
45. Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L. J. 161, 170-
71 (2008). 
46. See Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, The Working Group on 
Aggression at the Preparatory Commission for the International 
Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 589, 590 (2002). 
47. ICC, supra note 36, at art. 5(1)(d). 
48. ICC, supra note 36, at art. 5(2). 
49. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. 
Doc. A/9631, at 142 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016) 
The Fission and Fusion in International Use of Force 
315 
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this 
definition, and then goes on to list a number of acts that constitute 
acts of aggression. The crime of aggression was defined in Kampala by 
general agreement, as “the planning, preparation, initiation or 
execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over 
or to direct the political or military action which, by its character, 
gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations.” The crime of aggression thus came to be defined 
as (a) a leadership crime; (b) flowing forth from an act of aggression; 
and (c) subject to U.N. Charter constraints. 
The amendments to the ICC Statute approved by the Review 
Conference will enter into force following ratification of the 
amendments by no less than thirty States Parties. Furthermore, 
implementation of the decisions taken in Kampala with respect to the 
crime of aggression will be kept on ice until at least January 1, 2017, 
after which a decision to implement the same must again be approved 
by the same majority of States Parties required for amendments of 
the ICC Statute. Although this outcome is in a sense disappointing, 
the fact that nations of the world have now agreed on a definition of 
aggression will most likely serve as a deterrent against unbecoming 
military action by trigger-happy regimes.50 This outcome was neatly 
encapsulated by Ambassador Stephen Rapp and Prof. Harold Koh, 
the leading members of the American delegation as follows:  
The court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression without a further decision to take place sometime 
after January 1, 2017. The prosecutor cannot charge nationals 
of non-state parties, including the U.S. nationals, with the crime 
of aggression. No U.S. national can be prosecuted for aggression 
as long as the U.S. remains a non-state party. And if we were to 
become a state party, we’d still have the option to opt out from 
having our nationals prosecuted for aggression. So we ensure 
total protection for our Armed Forces and other U.S. nationals 
going forward.51 
Without the ICC having jurisdiction to deal with the crime of 
aggression today, it seems impossible to find ways of prosecution 
individuals from aggressor States and self-defending States who use 
 
50. See Johan Van der Vyer, Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression in the 
International Criminal Court, 1 U. MIAMI NAT’L SEC. & ARMED 
CONFLICT L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (discussing the consequences of entering 
into force the ICC Statute that the Review Conference approved). 
51. Harold Koh, Legal Advisor U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Engagement with 
the ICC and the Outcome of the Recently Concluded Review Conf. 
(June 15, 2010). 
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unlawful force that is disproportionate and not justified by military 
necessity.  
2. Unlawful Use of Force as a War Crime 
Violators of jus ad bellum requirements seemingly can still walk 
away scot-free unless certain practical solutions can be found in the 
ICC Statute. A practical solution can be constructed from the current 
international crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction. The ICC 
can exercise jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.52 In the case of unlawful use of force that 
is disproportionate and not justified by military necessity as a crime, 
the closest link can be drawn to war crimes. 
The ICC Statute distinguishes three categories of war crimes: 
1)First, gave breaches under the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
The statute merely repeats the definitions contained in the four 
Geneva Conventions (Articles 50 of Geneva Convention I,53 51 
of Geneva Convention II,54 130 of Geneva Convention III,55 and 
147 of Geneva Convention IV.56) 
2)The second category of war crimes covers other serious 
violations of the laws of war and customs applicable in 
international armed conflicts.57 
3)The third category introduces serious violation of Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions, which applies to non-
international armed conflicts. Common Article 3 includes a 
prohibition of acts such as violence to life and person, in 
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture. 
 
52. ICC, supra note 36, at art. 5. 
53. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 
75 U.N.T.S. 31. 
54. Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 51, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 85. 
55. Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 130, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
56. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
57. These crimes are derived from various sources. They reproduce to a 
large extent the rules from: the 1907 Hague Convention respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land Oct. 18, 1907, 2277 T.S. No. 539, 1 
Bevans 631; Protocol I, supra note 33; the Hague Declaration (III) 
Concerning Expanding Bullets, Sept. 4, 1900, 187 C.T.S. 459; Geneva 
Gas Protocol, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, 26 U.S.T. 571-72. 
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The selection of war crimes under the ICC Statute was based on 
two criteria. First, whether the norm should be part of customary 
international law, given that not all treaties of international 
humanitarian law defining war crimes are universally accepted, and 
second, whether the violation of the norm would give rise to 
individual criminal responsibility under customary international law.58 
The concern, therefore, in the current analysis is whether the illegal 
use of force that is not proportional and which is not justified by 
military necessity can be prosecuted as a war crime. Does the 
disproportional use of force not justified by military necessity under 
jus ad bellum qualify as a war crime?  
We have already seen that the crime of aggression cannot 
currently be prosecuted under the Rome Statute. What if an 
aggressor uses force that is disproportionate and not justified by 
military necessity—can the individuals who ordered such attacks be 
found liable for war crimes? What about self-defending States that 
retaliate with force that is disproportionate and not justified by 
military necessity? Is the use of such force unlawful? And can 
individuals who ordered such attacks be found liable for war crimes? 
In any armed conflict, civilians are bound to be killed and injured, 
and property is bound to be damaged or destroyed. In the endeavor 
to protect non-combatants and civilians in any armed conflict, the law 
must seek to balance the needs of humanity with the practical 
inevitabilities of warfare.59 The prime example of such a balance is 
found in Articles 51(5), 57(2) and 85(3)(b) and (c) of Additional 
Protocol I.60 The prohibition here is of “excessive” incidental loss to 
civilian life, which accepts by implication the occasional 
unavoidability of incidental losses which are not “excessive.” While 
this protection for civilian life is a fundamental principle in jus in 
bello,61 the principle of proportionality regarding defensive attacks in 
jus ad bellum is also aimed at the protection of human life.  
Article 8(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute employs similar language to 
Additional Protocol I when referring to war crimes:  
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such 
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe 
 
58. Herman von Hebel & D. Robinson, Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the 
Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE 
ROME STATUTE 392 (Roy S.K. Lee ed., 1999). 
59. Fenrick, supra note 25, at 98, 
60. Protocol I, supra note 33, at art. 8(b)(iv). 
61. Michael Bothe, War Crimes, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 397 (Antonio 
Cassese ed., 2002). 
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damage to the natural environment which would be clearly 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated. 
Since the language in the Rome Statute is specifically based on 
the language in Additional Protocol I, it will always be necessary to 
look back to Additional Protocol I for clarification on aspects of the 
rule not specifically covered in the Rome Statute.62 While the analysis 
in the Rome Statute can be conducted even on attacks under jus ad 
bellum, the analysis under Additional Protocol I seems to be clearly 
based on jus in bello.  
This is one of the great points where a fusion can be constructed. 
Attacks constructed by States as part of a war of aggression or in self-
defense should be analyzed under the strict requirements of the Rome 
Statute on individual criminal responsibility. But since the origins of 
such crimes are clearly from jus in bello a clear fusion emerges with 
jus ad bellum. Such fusion is by all means desirable because it ensures 
that the perpetrators of unlawful warfare get just desserts. This deters 
others who might consider exploiting the gaping hole in the crime of 
aggression as an advantage for committing war crimes. 
The concerns here are: 1) what does it mean to “intentionally 
launch an attack” with “the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life to civilians or damage to civilian objects” which 
will be “excessive” in relation to the “concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated”, 2) would breaches of jus contra 
bellum by military personnel when waging a war of aggression or in 
self-defense fit into these broad categories of action? 
The rules of treaty interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) are 
important in answering these questions.63 Article 31(1) of the VCLT 
provides: “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” This 
provision explains the first step of the interpretation process, that is, 
priority should be given to the ordinary meaning of the treaty’s text.64 
The second step requires that the interpretation proceed under the 
“context” of the treaty. The term “context” should be understood to 
automatically include the text of the treaty, the preamble, and 
possible annexes. The preamble of the Rome Statute provides its 
 
62. Eric Jaworski, “Military Necessity” and “Civilian Immunity”: Where is 
the Balance?, CHINESE J. INT’L L. 175, 187 (2003). 
63. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31 & 32, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
64. THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 
807 (Oliver Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016) 
The Fission and Fusion in International Use of Force 
319 
object and purpose, which is “to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of international crimes and thus contribute to the 
prevention of such crimes”. It is with this object and purpose that we 
will endeavor to color Article 8(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute with 
meaning.  
Article 31 of the VCLT indicates that the context of a treaty 
should include the preamble as well as the treaty itself. In addition, 
the subsequent agreements, such as the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence and the Elements of Crimes, are germane to interpretation. 
Article 32 of the VCLT provides the drafting history, or travaux 
préparatoires of the Statute, as supplementary means of 
interpretation. for when the ordinary meaning in Article 31 is 
ambiguous or obscure, or the general rule of interpretation leads to an 
absurd or unreasonable result.65  
Article 8(b)(iv) requires that in order for the war crime of 
disproportionate use of force not justified by military necessity to be 
committed, there has to be an “intentional launching of an attack.” 
The fundamental question here remains,  what is an “attack” within 
the meaning of Article 8(b)(iv). The Rome Statute does not define 
what an “attack” in Article 8 means, but when taken in context 
especially in relation to Article 8(1), then such an attack has to be 
large-scale. Therefore, the act of a single soldier shooting a rifle 
cannot be considered an attack. The provision requires “intentional 
launching.” Thus, intentionality should be considered the mens rea 
element of the war crime of disproportionate use of force not justified 
by military necessity. This element requires specific knowledge from 
the perpetrator that such an attack would have excessive effects on 
loss of civilian life.66 
On September 8, 1944, the Germans launched a V2 rocket at 
London, which was 14 meters (46ft) high and carried a ton (900 kg) 
of explosives.67 The rocket gauged a crater 10 meters (32ft) across, 
killing three people and injuring twenty-two. This can be seen as a 
quintessential example of an attack intentionally launched with full 
knowledge that it would cause excessive civilian casualties without 
serving any advantageous military aim. The distinction here should 
not be based on whether the analysis is based on jus in bello or jus ad 
bellum. Nor should the analysis on proportionality be influenced on 
 
65. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 94 (2004) (discussing the drafting of the Rome 
Statute). 
66. Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, 256, ICC-ASP/1/3, U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2011) [hereinafter Elements of Crimes]. 
67. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1997 TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶ 1958 (Yves Sandoz et al. 
eds., 1987). 
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these factors when seeking to ensure protection for civilians, in the 
case where such an attack was self-defensive or one sanctioned by the 
UN Security Council. This would mean that the individual who 
ordered such an attack would be found culpable of the unlawful use of 
force that is disproportionate and not justified by military necessity. 
In late January of 1991, as the Gulf War was raging between Iraqi 
forces led by Saddam Hussein and the UN-backed Gulf War coalition, 
Saddam successfully launched scud missiles aboard mobile launchers 
and initiated a series of attacks on Israel, Saudi Arabia, and 
Bahrain.68 In terms of military necessity, these weapons were of low-
accuracy, low-reliability, and had little utility as counteroffensive 
weapons. Within the first week of the attacks, Iraq launched twenty-
six missiles against Israel and although they caused relatively little 
destruction, such attacks fulfill the mens rea requirement in Article 
8(2)(b)(iv). If such a case is to be prosecuted before the ICC and the 
number of civilian causalities is shown to be excessive, then it could 
be very difficult for the perpetrator to disprove that the mental 
element of the offense was present. This can fill in the lacunae left by 
the non-prosecution of the international crime of aggression. In the 
two examples cited above, it would also be impossible to claim that 
civilian causalities were not the object of such attacks when the 
missiles “due to their construction, could not be precisely directed at 
a specific military target.”69 
The second question under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is what is the 
meaning of “excessive” as used to define the disproportionate use of 
force not justified by military necessity. It should be remembered that 
this analysis is done in relation to international armed conflicts as 
required under the elements of crime.70 This augurs well with 
constructing a fusion between jus in bello and jus ad bellum in the 
context of prosecuting the war crime of unlawful use which is 
disproportionate and justified by military necessity. Attacks on 
civilian populations are clearly forbidden in the context of 
international armed conflicts in jus in bello.71 It is clear that such 
killing would be even more reprehensible in the context of aggression 
under jus ad bellum since the primary principle is on the prohibition 
of resort to armed force. In the case of self-defense, the 
proportionality is measured as against the aggressive force used. In 
both cases, from a strictly military point of view, collateral civilian 
 
68. See Sean McKnight, The Failure of the Iraqi Forces, in THE GULF WAR 
ASSESSED 175 (John Pimlott & Stephen Badsey eds., 1992). 
69. Heike Spieker, Civilian Immunity, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE 
PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 84 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999). 
70. Elements of Crimes, supra 67 (quoting “The conduct took place in the 
context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.”). 
71. Protocol I, supra note 33, at art. 51(2). 
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life must be lost. The question under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is whether 
such loss of civilian life is excessive as compared to the military 
objective pursued. This analysis can be made in jus in bello 
(immediate military goals) or in jus ad bellum (ultimate military),72 in 
the analysis that Steenberghe refers to as the “general vs. particular 
dichotomy.”73 
What is “excessive” in a given scenario might seem very 
subjective, but a few examples from the past can show that this is not 
always the case. The raids in Dresden, London, Hiroshima, and 
Nagasaki during World War II offer clear examples of situations that 
would be considered excessive. While some commentators have argued 
that this disproportionate use of force is what ended World War II,74 
this is a very unsympathetic way of justifying unlawful use of force. 
Under the strict requirements on proportionality in Article 
8(2)(b)(iv), the fatalities witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagaski would 
easily constitute “excessive” loss of life. That the United States is not 
a State Party to the Rome Statute is an argument for another 
occasion.75 It seems clear that the latter attacks by the Allies were not 
carried out with proportionality and the protection of civilian lives as 
a major factor in the planning stages. These would fulfill the 
requirements on the elements of crime under Article 8(2)(b)(iv).76 
While our analysis of the crime of disproportionate use of force 
not justified by military necessity has so far been based on 
international armed conflicts, the vast number of current armed 
conflicts are non-international. It is regrettable that Article 
8(2)(b)(iv) would not apply to non-international armed conflicts. This 
means certain attacks in the near past that have been criticized as 
being disproportionate might not fall under the desirable fusion 
between jus in bello and jus ad bellum in the context of the crime of 
disproportionate use of force not justified by military necessity. This 
is all the more disappointing when one considers recent Israeli attacks 
in Gaza and the internal conflicts in Syria. ISIS in the Middle East is 
another threat. 
 
72. Moussa, supra note 39, at 965. 
73. Van Steenberghe, supra note 35, at 115. 
74. See Seth Frantzman, A Short History of ‘Disproportionate Force’, SETH 
J. FRANTZMAN (Jan. 22, 2009), available at 
http://sethfrantzman.com/2009/01/22/a-short-history-of-
disproportionate-force/ [http://perma.cc/MW74-3L2M] (discussing 
whether Israel used disproportionate force in response to Hamas). 
75. See Luke A. McLaurin, Can the President “Unsign” a Treaty? A 
Constitutional Inquiry, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 94, 94 (2006). 
76. Jaworski, supra note 63, at 189. 
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3. Constructing a Fusion: Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in relation to 
Combatants and Civilians 
The traditional theory of just war comprises two sets of 
principles: one governs the resort to war (jus ad bellum) and the other 
governs the conduct of war (jus in bello).77 It is perfectly possible, and 
it has been argued, for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an 
unjust war to be fought justly (in strict accordance with the rules).78 
This therefore necessitates the use of neutral principles to find 
culpability for combatants who contravene the rules of the just 
conduct of war regardless of whether the war is just or unjust. This is 
the “divergence” view, which posits that the two principles jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello should not be considered in a way that 
conflates the two because it would lead to absurd results. 
The “convergence” view on the other hand requires that the 
analysis of the conduct of combatants (jus in bello) be done in such a 
way that would consider whether the war being fought is just or 
unjust (jus ad bellum). The logical result would therefore be one 
where if a war is considered unjust, the combatants fighting for the 
unjust cause can be referred to as “unjust combatants” and thus even 
if they were to kill legitimate combatants involved in the war, their 
actions would not be justified under jus in bello. The consideration 
here is that an “unjust combatant” fights for an unjust cause ab 
initio. If a war is fought with just cause and maybe due to its 
unnecessary or disproportionate nature the combatants in such a case 
would be “just combatants.”79 
Supporters of the divergence view find that it makes no difference 
what kind of conduct unjust combatants display in war where they 
fight without a just cause. Unjust combatants cannot be held 
criminally liable for killing legitimate targets while involved in an 
unjust war. They only are liable when they violate the principles of 
jus ad bellum. Therefore, the moral position for both the unjust 
combatant and the just combatant is indistinguishable. Walzer has 
called this situation “the moral equality of soldiers.”80 The idea was 
that international law had no option but to accept war, independent 
of the justice of its origin, as relations between the relevant states and 
to regulate it. Hence both parties are in equal position in legal terms.81 
 
77. These principles have been previously described in this essay. 
78. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 21 (1977). 
79. Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 ETHICS 693, 693 
(2004). 
80. Walzer, supra note 79, at 34. 
81. WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (1904). 
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4. Distinguishing Combatants from Non-Combatants 
Under jus in bello, combatants are members of the established 
armed forces of a government who have a legal right to engage in 
combat operations.82 This characterization seems quite easy to 
decipher until one examines the realm of non-international armed 
conflicts, which have increased in recent decades. With increased 
number of non-international armed conflicts, members of dissident 
forces, other organized armed groups, and militias are now taking part 
in hostilities. Individuals in such groups do not enjoy the protection 
accorded to civilians when they take a direct part in hostilities. They 
are not, however, entitled to the rights accorded to combatants strictu 
sensu.  
Combatants enjoy “combatant immunity” under international 
law, protecting them from prosecution for death or injury to person or 
damage or destruction of property resulting from combatants acts 
that otherwise comply with the law of war in armed conflict.83 A 
combatant: 
(i)Has the right to carry out lawful attacks on enemy military 
personnel and military objectives; 
(ii)Is at risk of attack by enemy military forces at any time, 
wherever located, regardless of the duties or activities in which 
he or she is engaged; 
(iii) Bears no criminal responsibility: 
  (a). for killing or injuring; 
      1.enemy military personnel or 
      2.civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, or  
  (b). for causing damage or destruction to property      
incidental to lawful military operations, provided his or her acts, 
including the means employed to commit those acts, have been 
in compliance with the law of war; and 
If captured: 
(i)Is entitled to prisoner of war status (POW), 
 
82. Protocol I, supra note 33, at art. 43(2); MODEL MANUAL ON THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT FOR ARMED FORCES (A.P. V. Rogers & P. Malherbe 
eds., 1999). Under Customary IHL, all members of the armed forces of a 
party to the conflict are combatants, except medical and religious 
personnel. 
83. See U.S. v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 552-58 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding 
that the defendant was not entitled to lawful combatant immunity). 
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(ii) May be detained indefinitely until cessation of active 
hostilities, 
(iii) Is entitled to humane treatment, 
(iv) May be tried for violations of the law of war, and 
(v)May only be punished for violations of the law of war as a 
result of a fair and regular trial.84 
The principle of distinction, which is one of the corner stones of 
jus in bello, requires that all involved in the armed conflict distinguish 
between combatants and civilians. Combatants must thus distinguish 
themselves from civilians who don’t participate directly in hostilities 
and so may not be attacked.85 This position exists independent of the 
legality of the war. It has been suggested that the impact of the 
legality of the war “would mean that the members of the aggressor’s 
armed forces would not be entitled to the rights that legitimate 
combatants would be entitled to or to be protected by other rules of 
war.”86 But the jus in bello framework frowns upon this position. 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) protects the integrity and 
dignity of the individuals whether they fight for the aggressor or its 
victims.87 Common Article 2 and 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
captures this position clearly by stating that IHL is triggered by the 
commencement of armed conflicts. 
A civilian may convert himself into a combatant at any time 
when the hostilities are taking place. As a matter of fact, every 
combatant is a former civilian. Nobody is ever born a combatant, 
everyone is born a civilian. In the same breadth, a combatant may 
retire and become a civilian. But at any given point a person is either 
a combatant or a civilian. An individual cannot (and is not allowed 
to) be both at the same time, nor can he constantly shift from one 
position to the other at the same time.88 
It is clear that combatants, whichever side of the divide they are 
on, have a moral and legal obligation to respect the in bello principles. 
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This is what has been referred to as their in bello responsibility. This 
section addresses whether combatants can be held responsible for 
participating in an unjust war or a war that is incompatible with ad 
bellum principles. Do they, aside from their in bello responsibilities, 
also have an ad bellum responsibility? This would place combatants in 
a dilemma of having to gauge the justice of the war they are involved 
in and refuse to fight if the conflict contravenes ad bellum principles 
and whether they just have to follow orders regardless of the just or 
injustice occasioned by the war.  
5. Combatants’ in bello and ad bellum responsibility 
A distinction has to be drawn between unlawful combatants 
under jus bello and ad bellum principles. In jus ad bellum, the state of 
unlawful combatancy, that philosopher Jeff McMahan calls “unjust 
combatants,” starts with the status of the war. This term borrows 
heavily from the just war theorists. According to the just war theory, 
a war is not lawful unless it meets an ad bellum purpose. If the war 
contravenes ad bellum (is not self-defense, defense of others, or 
putting a stop to human rights violations), meaning that the 
combatants are fighting a war of aggression, then all the actions taken 
by the combatants should be illegal ab initio. In jus in bello, unlawful 
combatants are individuals who engage in covert attempts at 
combatancy and civilianhood at the same time. Persons engaging in 
military raids at night, while purporting to be an innocent civilian by 
day are neither civilians nor combatants: they are unlawful 
combatants.89  
The study of the legal and moral responsibility in warfare shows 
that combatants cannot be held responsible for their ad bellum 
violations.90 They can be held responsible for any kind of in bello 
violation. Hence, this kind of responsibility is what ethicists have 
called their “in bello responsibility.”91 
According to the moral equality of a soldier’s position, it would 
follow that jus in bello applies equally to all belligerents.92 This idea, 
that jus in bello and jus ad bellum principles operate independently of 
each other as we have already stated, is well developed in 
international law.93 An example is found in the Iran-Iraq war. While it 
 
89. Id. at 154. 
90. See YEHUDA MELZER, CONCEPTS OF JUST WAR 83-88 (1975). 
91. Carl Ceulemans, The Moral Equality of Combatants, 37 U.S. ARMY WAR 
C. J. 99, 99 (2007). 
92. Yoram Dinstein, Neutrality, the Rights of Shipping and the Use of Force 
in the Persian Gulf War (Part II), 80 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 594, 607 
(1988). 
93. Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Jus ad Bellum and 
Jus in Bello, 9 REV. INT’L STUD. 221, 226, 231 (1983). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016) 
The Fission and Fusion in International Use of Force 
326 
is generally accepted that Iraq was the aggressor, Iraqi combatants 
would still have the privileges accorded to legitimate combatants 
when captured.94 They will have, for instance, the rights to prisoner of 
war (POW) status. This view therefore construes belligerent status in 
a way detached from the right to go to war in the first place.95 
Another view maintains the moral equality of soldiers and justifies 
the separation of the two bodies of law by asserting that an aggressor 
in an aggressive war can enjoy the whole range of entitlements of 
war.96 Lauterpacht, however, tends to disagree with this view; he 
observes that before the emergence of the prohibition of war, all 
belligerents, whatever the cause of their war, were subject to the same 
laws of war. After the emergence of the prohibition of war, however, 
there is no longer a legal right to war. Therefore, an illegal war “can 
no longer confer upon the guilty belligerent all the rights which 
traditional international law.”97 If this is the case, do combatants who 
target “legitimate” targets commit blatant acts of murder? Can their 
actions be justified under this view? 
Such practical questions call for further analysis of the view that 
jus in bello can operate unaffected by jus ad bellum. In terms of 
combatant responsibility as autonomous individuals, the necessity for 
such analysis becomes even more important. If we are to follow the 
International Court of Justice Advisory opinion in the Nuclear 
Weapons opinion; that a use of force that is proportionate under the 
law of self-defense, must (in order to be lawful) also meet the 
requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict which 
compromise, in particular, the principles and rules of humanitarian 
law.98 The concern here is for the development of a more convergent 
view than the perpetuation of the divergent view. 
II. Conclusion 
There are many points of fusion and fission of jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello in the body of the law of war. There has been controversy 
over the application of the crime of disproportionate use of force not 
justified by military necessity and whether certain categories of 
actions can be prosecuted in the ICC when the analysis is based on 
jus ad bellum. We have argued for more fusion in the context of 
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prosecuting the war crime of disproportionate use of force not justified 
by military necessity. Nonetheless, we have argued for some fission 
when it comes to the treatment of combatants and civilians under the 
two bodies of law.  
It should be remembered that the aim of international law under 
the auspices of the United Nations is to ensure that there is 
international peace and security. War in itself is prohibited and States 
are encouraged to solve their differences through peaceful means. 
However, the truth of recent times is very different, and armed 
conflicts continue to reign supreme in most parts of the world. The 
introduction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to act as a 
center for stopping the impunity that is perpetrated in armed conflicts 
is greatly welcome. Whatever the outcome of the debate is between 
jus in bello and jus ad bellum proponents regarding either the 
separation or conflation of the two bodies, both sides should work 
towards ensuring sustainable peace and security amongst States. 
